Public financing of elections is arguably the most radical and far reaching election reform instituted in the United States in the last thirty years. Although numerous studies and analyses have examined public financing of elections on the national level, the academic literature concerning the more common and varied state public financing systems is surprisingly sparse. As of the time of this study, there was not an up to date and comprehensive database of the characteristics and histories of state public financing measures. Accordingly, the first project of this study was to establish such as database through the synthesis of a variety of sources. This database containing the profiles of all current state public financing systems is a significant contribution to the existing literature and will hopefully prove a useful resource for future researchers of the subject. These historical characteristics are presented in grid form in Addendum 1.

The major goal of this thesis was to explore the questions of why public financing was adopted in certain states at certain times and how it came to reach the agenda of the policy makers of these states. The very breath of public financing implementation is quite striking, and makes it especially difficult to establish patterns among states. Nevertheless, factors ranging from the political, cultural, and demographic characteristics of states, to the political atmosphere surrounding public financing adoption, to the intentions and strategies of the advocates of public financing themselves were examined to isolate relevant tendencies. A number of conclusions are evident, which may provide insight into the future of state public financing of elections.

TOP

One of the main determinations of the study is that simple grant party public financing systems are different in structure and intent from the candidate based partial and full public financing systems. Both types of systems emerged at the same time, and both may have originated partially from the attention directed toward campaign practices by the Watergate scandals. However, in addition to differences in structure, simple grant public financing measures are typified by much lower profile adoption methods and an entirely different set of policy entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the states which have adopted only simple grant public financing measures tend to have starkly different characteristics from those which have adopted more comprehensive systems. The evidence seems to indicate that party public financing measures were mainly designed to counter the slow decline of political party power with the onset of televised candidate based campaigns. In contrast, candidate public financing was largely intended to alter the structure of campaigning in order to achieve a "public good’ and to create more access into the political system.

TOP

Surveys and interviews confirm the conclusions of pre-existing academic studies that significant differences exist in state attitudes concerning citizen responsibility, political morality, innovation, and government intervention. The political culture most conducive to comprehensive public financing is typified by Elazar’s moralistic archetype, which Rice and Arnett would describe as high civic culture. The positive conceptions of public service, fairness, and proactive behavior which typify moralistic cultures often produce a progressive populist sentiment among public officials in these states. These values make legislators more willing to consider government reforms even in the face of only minor or indirect galvanizing events. Furthermore, the diffusion of moralistic culture throughout the population often may lead to stronger public interest groups, which universally play an important entrepreneurial role in reform policy generation. Thus, in these states an alliance between public interest groups and concerned lawmakers often combine the policy development, agenda determination, alternative specification, and decision-making roles in promoting public financing legislation. The most obvious illustration of pure moralistic culture is shown in the case study of Minnesota and Wisconsin above.

If Elazar is to be believed, moralistic culture was originally introduced and spread in America by Puritans and other Northern Europeans. Significant evidence from Lieske and other studies seems to indicate that the original culture of a region exercises a strong assimilating power over subsequent immigrants. Thus, elements of moralistic culture seem to have remained present even in areas where the original moralistic inhabitants have been numerically overwhelmed by settlers from other cultural backgrounds. In these states, the high priority placed on equality and government accountability has combined with a positive view of government intervention in society to create a fertile breeding ground for public financing legislation.

It is notable that race seems to trump ethnicity in determining the political culture of American states. States with large minority populations tend to have very low levels of democratization, civic culture, and public financing adoption even when they were originally populated by Northern European settlers. In these bifurcated states, racial tensions may polarize political dialogue to such a degree that public financing and most other election reform measures are distrusted by the white majority because of their potential to empower the traditionally disenfranchised minority population.

TOP

Even in states with political cultures conducive to consideration of political reforms, a series of circumstances and behaviors frequently must occur for election reform to reach the agenda of state policy makers. In the most common legislative scenario, election and government reform is first brought to the agenda of elected officials by negative media attention generated by specific focusing events, such as state corruption scandals. Once these events create windows of opportunity, a specific handful of public interest groups play an integral role in the alternative specification period by promoting pre-existing public financing proposals as a solution to the problem highlighted by the scandal, even if the connection is not readily apparent.

Public interest groups support public financing legislation for a variety of reasons. Some, such as the League of Women Voters and Common Cause, believe that the reduction in campaign spending which public financing allows would be a positive development in and of itself. Other organizations, such as economic justice coalitions, civil rights groups, and labor unions, give their support because of the greater access to the political system public financing may provide for less wealthy candidates. This emphasis on political equality, may be an end in itself for many of these organizations. However, public financing systems also undoubtedly hold the promise of greater influence for many of the supporters of these more progressive groups. During the decision-making phase of policy generation, public interest groups with positive name recognition are sometimes able to parlay their support into significant political capital. However, in most states public financing is only passed if it appeals to the sensibilities of legislative leadership or enjoys some over-riding political or institutional logic within the context of that state’s politics.

The existence of statutory citizen ballot initiatives in certain states also can play a distinctive structural role in determining the circumstances through which public financing reaches the political agenda. In the 1990’s, coalitions of progressive groups have shown that the ballot initiative process can be used to institute far more comprehensive public financing systems than even progressively moralistic legislatures had previously adopted. In these situations, the policy entrepreneur function is generally played by a specific organization or small set of associations, which then successfully convince a larger group of organizations of the utility of the public financing proposal.

TOP

Strikingly, implementation of candidate based public financing through legislative channels is clearly linked to Democratic Party control of state legislatures. As shown in Chapter 3, the reasons for Democratic adoption of public financing vary greatly across states and include moralistic ideals of government, rational institutional reform, and even occasional calculations of partisan advantage. However, Chapter 2 demonstrates that the Democratic Parties which implement public financing systems tend to be among the more liberal in the country. Thus, an underlying willingness to use government intervention to secure whatever goals are desired appears necessary for public financing to become a viable alternative even once election reform has reached the agenda. As discussed at the end of Chapter 2, significant evidence suggests that Democratic liberalism may be tied to high levels of white ethnic diversity and urbanization. Unlike more self-sufficient rural populations, the inhabitants of areas with high population densities and diversities often have come to really on their government as an important mediating force which generates important policies concerning infrastructure, safety, and economic security. This, may account for the increased acceptance which citizens of populous, ethnically diverse states seem to show for the interventionist policies integral to public financing systems.

In states which have recently experienced significant scandals, the key to the adoption of public financing often lies in the ability of public interest groups to tie public financing adoption to improved public perception of elected officials. In many of these cases, public interest groups are able to accomplish this association, even when public financing of elections does not directly address the systemic problems uncovered by the blossoming scandal.

Consideration of public financing systems over less expensive alternatives such as disclosure laws and contribution limits also requires a significant budgetary base, which usually corresponds with high levels of socioeconomic development in addition to economic cycles. As an example, the virtual explosion of full public financing systems and municipal partial public financing systems during the later 1990’s seems to indicate a correspondence between public financing and rising budgetary resources.

Within statutory initiative campaigns, adoption of public financing systems requires convincing the population as a whole of their utility. Since opponents are often able to mobilize significant monetary resources against the measures, success in ballot measure campaigns seems to be tide to the breadth of supporting coalitions, and not simply the political culture of states. However, even widely supported ballot measures stand a much greater chance of success if they are structured to appeal to the cultural values of their respective populations. A well-scripted 1998 "Clean Elections" ballot measure succeeded in Arizona, which has dominant traditionalistic culture and a large minority of Hispanic immigrants. However, in 2000, similar measures with smaller coalitions failed in Missouri and, interestingly, Oregon—a purely moralistic state with a homogeneous population.

TOP

The main goal of this thesis has been to uncover of the origins of public financing adoption through an examination of the cultural proclivities, societal characteristics, historical trends, and individual stories of the states that have implemented public financing of elections. The findings which have been presented do not purport to forecast where, when, or in what form public financing may be implemented in the future. However, considering the many striking correspondences that have been uncovered, it may be useful to briefly advance some insights which this historical examination may provide concerning the future of state public financing of elections.

In contrast to simple grant measures, the 1990’s saw a significant growth state full and municipal partial public financing systems implemented by ballot measures and other non-traditional means. The generally liberal and interventionist nature of many city governments indicates that municipal public financing may continue to expand, though the success of advocates in the late 1990’s may be closely tied to the fiscal boost bequeathed to normally stretched city budgets by a strong economy.

The continued spread of full public financing systems looks unlikely in the short term. Except for a small system for gubernatorial elections in Vermont, full public financing advocates have not demonstrated they can secure passage of "Clean Money" measures through state legislatures. Continued reliance on ballot measures would restrict the pool for adoption of public financing to a group of generally conservative states west of the Mississippi River. Furthermore, the failure of ballot initiatives in Missouri and Oregon must give full public financing advocates pause before they launch campaigns in the remaining liberal moralistic states of California and Washington.

In the end, the public financing archetype with the greatest chance of continued adoption seems to be statewide partial public financing provisions developed over time by a wide coalition of public interest groups and promoted through the traditional legislative route during periods of scandal and Democratic Party dominance. In the past, a rough alliance of state chapters of Common Cause and the League of Women Voters often proven sufficient to secure passage of public financing legislation. However, in the 1990’s a significant number of Common Cause state chapters have reduced their activity as the larger Common Cause organization has subtly hit a membership plateau. The League of Women Voters, though a powerful coalition partner, has rarely taken the lead in developing and lobbying for public financing legislation.

Thus, it would seem that future partial public financing measures may only result from the formation of wider coalitions, which encompass larger numbers of progressive groups, roughly on the model of the successful 1996 Maine ballot measure coalition. In addition, legislators seem to be much more willing to approve public financing for statewide candidates than for their own races. Only four legislative public financing systems have been approved by state legislatures, and only one—a very limited system in Nebraska—has been adopted since the 1970’s.^[237]

Finally, moralistic attitudes which include a positive view of government intervention make public financing implementation far more likely. This positive view of government innovation does not need to characterize all levels of society, as can be seen by the success of public financing proposals in Florida and Arizona. However, it must be present in some significant way among politically mobilized elements of the population or the political elite.

States which may provide promising arenas for future partial public financing adoption include California, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington. In addition, systems in Maryland, Vermont, and Wisconsin may need to be significantly reformed to ensure their continued effectiveness. However, if historical patterns repeat themselves, the rapidly rising Hispanic populations in many of these states may inspire racial and cultural tensions which may prove an obstacle to progressive coalition building by polarizing the political spectrum of these states.

The effects of public financing systems, are beyond the scope of this study. However, the real key to the future of public financing likely lies in the consensus which develops concerning the success of current systems. In surveys and interviews, reform advocates in Arizona, Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, and Rhode Island reported being very satisfied with their systems, while reformers in Hawaii, Maryland, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Vermont seemed less enthusiastic. Undoubtedly, the best predictor of whether comprehensive public financing will continue to expand in states and localities, and whether it has any chance of being adopted on a national level, is the ability of systems presently in place to achieve their wide-ranging goals while maintaining the support of the politicians who are their major constituents.

Very few studies have profiled the effects of state public financing systems. Hopefully, this thesis will aid these explorations through its discovery of significant patterns of characteristics common among states adopting comprehensive public financing measures. In addition, this thesis may assist future inquiries by defining the goals and intentions of the politicians and activists who implemented public financing systems in the first place. The jury may still be out on the ultimate effectiveness of public financing measures. However, state attempts to provide public funds for political campaigns are arguably the most significant political reform instituted during the preceding three decades. Thus, for the good of our democracy, one can only hope that future years will witness an increase in academic studies examining the utility of public financing of elections.

TOP

Proceed to Addendum 1:
A Comprehensive Database of State Public Financing Systems